以前学英语，是想了解世界；现在学英语，是想了解中国zt

以前学英语，是想了解世界；现在学英语，是想了解中国

作者：快乐流浪汉 提交日期：2009-9-23 15:11:00 | 分类: | 访问量：236

纽约时报:中国在非洲广施援助 经济已成外交后盾 　　2009年09月23日 00:19 来源：中国经济网编译 陶冶 　　 　　 本文来自9月22日《纽约时报》，原文作者是SHARON LaFRANIERE，中国经济网现编译如下，仅供参考。 　　 　　 位于撒哈拉以南非洲的纳米比亚并不是一个世界级领导人经常光顾的地方，这个仅有2百万人口的国家基础设施极端落后，道路崎岖，沙尘飞扬。因此，当中国国家主席胡锦涛率领130多名随从官员在2007年2月份访问这个国家的时候，盛大的场面简直就像是一场庆典。 　　 　　 不久以后，中国政府就批准了向纳米比亚提供低息贷款，利用这笔贷款纳米比亚向中国购买了价值5530万美元的商品。中国表示，这笔交易不仅满足了纳米比亚的急需，而且也给中国带来了好处。 　　 　 　 中国向纳米比亚提供贷款只是一个典型。事实上，包括巴基斯坦、安哥拉、哈萨克斯坦和塔吉克斯坦等国都曾接受中国巨额援助贷款。这些贷款不仅促进了中国商品 出口而且也成为中国推行外交政策的工具。中国提供的这些贷款绝大部分都是低息贷款，利息率远低于商业贷款利率。不过，这些贷款并非完全没有附加条件：大多 数贷款的用途都必须得到中国政府的认可。 　　 　　 中国贷款给非洲大陆带来了巨大变化，一些国家修建了新的公路，发电厂和基础通信网络等。自2001年以来，中国在非洲资助了近200个建设项目，这些贷款大部分都是经由中国进出口银行承办的。 　　 　　 国际观察家们说，中国已经成为非洲大陆的一个主要角色，发挥着越来越大的作用。虽然中国向非洲国家提供的援助贷款不像西方国家那样附加许多政治条件，但是这些贷款通常都会给中国公司——尤其是国有公司带来巨大商业机会(本文来自《纽约时报》，编译时有删节)。 　　（原文详见http://intl.ce.cn/specials/zxxx/200909/22/t20090922_20074120.shtml） 　　 　　——上面这篇报道与《参考消息》和《环球时报》常用的手法如出一辙，断章取义、扭曲原意甚至颠倒黑白。以下为《纽约时报》原文： 　　 　　China Spreads Aid in Africa, With a Catch 　　By SHARON LaFRANIERE and JOHN GROBLER 　　Published: September 21, 2009 　　 　 　WINDHOEK, Namibia — It is not every day that global leaders set foot in this southern African nation of gravel roads, towering sand dunes and a mere two million people. So when President Hu Jintao of China touched down here in February 2007 with a 130-person delegation in tow, it clearly was not just a courtesy call. 　　 　　And in fact, China soon granted Namibia a big low-interest loan, which Namibia tapped to buy $55.3 million worth of Chinese-made cargo scanners to deter smugglers. It was a neat illustration, Chinese officials said, of how doing good in Namibia could do well for China, too. 　　 　　Or so it seemed until Namibia charged that the state-controlled company selected by China to provide the scanners — a company until recently run by President Hu’s son — had facilitated the deal with millions of dollars in illegal kickbacks. And until China threw up barriers when Namibian investigators asked for help looking into the matter. 　　 　　Now the scanners seem to illustrate something else: the aura of boosterism, secrecy and back-room deals that has clouded China’s use of billions of dollars in foreign aid to court the developing world. 　　 　　From Pakistan to Angola to Kyrgyzstan, China is using its enormous pool of foreign currency savings to cement diplomatic alliances, secure access to natural resources and drum up business for its flagship companies. Foreign aid — typically cut-rate loans, sometimes bundled with more commercial lines of credit — is central to this effort. 　　 　　 Leaders of developing nations have embraced China’s sales pitch of easy credit, without Western-style demands for political or economic reform, for a host of unmet needs. The results can be clearly seen in new roads, power plants, and telecommunications networks across the African continent — more than 200 projects since 2001, many financed with preferential loans from the Chinese government’s Exim Bank. 　　 　　 Increasingly, though, experts argue that China’s aid comes with a major catch: It must be used to buy goods or services from companies, many of them state-controlled, that Chinese officials select themselves. Competitive bidding by the borrowing nation is discouraged, and China pulls a veil over vital data like project costs, loan terms and repayment conditions. Even the dollar amount of loans offered as foreign aid is treated as a state secret. 　　 　　Anticorruption crusaders complain that secrecy invites corruption, and that corruption debases foreign assistance. 　　 　 　“China is using this financing to buy the loyalty of the political elite,” said Harry Roque, a University of the Philippines law professor who is challenging the legality of Chinese-financed projects in the Philippines. “It is a very effective tool of soft diplomacy. But it is bad for the citizens who have to repay these loans for graft-ridden contracts.” 　　 　　In fact, such secrecy runs counter to international norms for foreign assistance. In a part of the world prone to corruption and poor governance, it also raises questions about who actually benefits from China’s projects. The answers, international development specialists say, are hidden from public view. 　　 　　“We know more about China’s military expenditures than we do about its foreign aid,” said David Shambaugh, an author and China scholar at George Washington University. “Foreign aid really is a glaring contradiction to the broader trend of China’s adherence to international norms. It is so strikingly opaque it really makes one wonder what they are trying to hide.” 　　 　　Until recently, wealthy nations could hardly hold themselves out as an example of how to run foreign aid, either. Many projects turned out to be tainted by corruption or geared to enrich the donor nation’s contractors, not the impoverished borrowers. But over the past 10 or 15 years, some 30 developed nations under the umbrella of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) have made a concerted effort to clean up their assistance programs. 　　 　　They demanded that foreign money be awarded and spent transparently, using competitive bidding and outlawing bribery. Increasingly, they also are also pushing to give borrowers more choice among suppliers and contractors, rather than insisting that funds be recycled back to the donor nation’s companies. 　　 　　China, which is not a member of the O.E.C.D., is operating under rules that the West has largely abandoned. It mixes aid and business in secret government-to-government agreements. It requires that foreign aid contracts be awarded to Chinese contractors it picks through a closed-door bidding process in Beijing. Its attempts to prevent corrupt practices by its companies overseas appear weak. 　　 　 　Some developing nations insist on independently comparing prices before accepting China’s largesse. Others do not bother. “Very often they are getting something they wouldn’t be able to get without China’s financing,” said Chris Alden, a specialist on China-African relations with the London School of Economics and Political Science. “They presume that the Chinese are going to give value for money.” 　　 　　 Development experts say they have tried to convince the Chinese government that better safeguards and a more open process will enhance its efforts to gain influence and business. If its projects collapse because of kickbacks or inflated costs, they argue, China will end up exporting not only goods and services, but a reputation for corruption that it is already battling at home. 　　 　　But Deborah Brautigam, the author of a coming book on China’s economic ties with Africa titled “The Dragon’s Gift,” says Beijing is hesitant to hobble its companies with Western-style restraints before they have become 　　 　　（全文见：http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/world/africa/22namibia.html?_r=4&pagewanted=1&hp）